Optimality and the Cutoff of Defenses Against Financers of Consumer Sales by Schwartz, Alan
Boston College Law Review
Volume 15
Issue 3 Number 3 Article 2
2-1-1974
Optimality and the Cutoff of Defenses Against
Financers of Consumer Sales
Alan Schwartz
Follow this and additional works at: http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/bclr
Part of the Banking and Finance Law Commons, and the Secured Transactions Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Boston College Law Review by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School. For more information,
please contact nick.szydlowski@bc.edu.
Recommended Citation
Alan Schwartz, Optimality and the Cutoff of Defenses Against Financers of Consumer Sales, 15 B.C.L.
Rev. 499 (1974), http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/bclr/vol15/iss3/2
OPTIMALITY AND THE CUTOFF OF DEFENSES
AGAINST FINANCERS OF
CONSUMER SALES
ALAN SCHWARTZ *
When a consumer pays in cash or by check and the seller
performs improperly, the consumer must initiate a lawsuit in order
to recover his payments, and he cannot recover them or damages
until the suit is concluded. Courts and commentators seem un-
troubled by these disadvantages whiCh attend cash purchases, ap-
parently for two reasons: First, people who pay cash present un-
sympathetic cases; they have money, and its presence is usually
associated with an ability to take care of oneself. Second, cash saleS
are cheaper than credit sales because the investment income forgone
as the result of a cash payment will usually be less than the cost of
credit.' Buyers who purchase on credit are, of course, disad-
vantaged by having to pay credit costs, but in the event of improper
seller performance they can withhold further installment payments;
they therefore have a "weapon" to induce performance, they need
not initiate law suits, and they can retain at least part of the price
during the duration of an action. When, however, a credit purchaser
has his note transferred to a finance company, or he waives sales
defenses he may have against the seller as against a third party who
has financed the sale, or he uses a bank credit card to make the
purchase, state law often provides that if the seller breaches, the
buyer must continue to make payments to the finance company or
bank, and must proceed against the seller. The intervention of a
third party, called here the financer, thus visits on the credit buyer
the same disadvantages which attend cash purchases and it does this
for those consumers who lack the resources to pay cash and who
must nevertheless continue to bear the higher costs associated with
credit buying.
* Associate Professor of Law, Indiana University; 13.5., Bates College, 1961; LL.B.,
Yale Law School, 1964. I am grateful to my colleagues Jon Hirschoff, Harry Pratter, Julius
Getman, Douglass Boshkoff and Philip Thorpe for their helpful comments on prior drafts of
this article. Any errors which remain are mine alone.
1 This can be illustrated with a simple example. Assume a buyer with $100 in cash, who
must decide whether to pay for a product priced at $100 with that money, or to finance the
purchase. If the $100 would otherwise have been in a savings account paying 5% interest, and
the financing period is one year, the cost of paying cash is approximately $105, $100 for the
price and $5 for the forgone income the principal would have yielded. The cost of financing,
however, may be as high as $131: $100 for the price, $36 representing the 36% interest which
is not uncommon for small loans—see Uniform Consumer Credit Code § 2.201(2)(i); H.
Kripke, Consumer Credit Text-Cases-Materials 4 (l970); Wall Street Journal, Aug. 24, 1973,
at 1, col. 6—less the $5 the $100 is earning. Paying cash is plainly more advantageous,
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It is hardly surprising, therefore, that consumer spokesmen
often urge the abolition of the holder in due course rule, as set forth
for example in the Uniform Commercial Code § 3-305, and the
prohibition or waiver of defense clauses, and more recently have
been arguing that consumers should be able to assert sales defenses
against credit card issuers. The standard response to these conten-
tions,_ primarily by business interests, has been that insulating
financers against sales defenses reduces the risk to them of financing
sales to consumers; that the reduction in . risk is reflected in lower
ointerest rates to sellers, which sellers pass n; and that consumers, in
the aggregate, thus benefit from current law. Moreover, these in-
terests assert, retailers who must finance their sales, rather than
carry their own credit, are often small, individual concerns. Not
only will reform hurt small businesses by raising their credit costs,
but these are the businesses who frequently sell to the poor; hurting
them thus constricts the opportunities of the poor to purchase. 2
Advocates of reform, in part accepting this view, stress the harm to
consumers of being unable to withhold payments and the allegedly
slight additional costs reform will impose, 3 while those desiring to
maintain the status quo stress the costs more heavily than the gains.
It is my purpose to assert the relevance of a different set of
values to this debate, namely those values which underlie the pur-
suit of an optimal allocation of resources. 4 Let us put aside the case
2
 See, e.g., McNeill, The Necessity of Retaining the Holder in Due Course Doctrine, 5
U.C.C.L.J. 149 (1972); Dennon, The Uniform Consumer Credit Code Bombshell, 22 Pers.
Fin, L.Q.Rep. 125 (1968). For a scholarly version of this view, see R. Posner, Economic
Analysis of Law 54-55 (1973). An empirical study of the effect of eliminating negotiability in
financing home improvement sales •provides some support for the business interests' claim,
finding that the burden of reform fell most heavily on small dealers, who made credit sales
mainly in low income areas, Comment, A Case Study of the Impact of Consumer Legislation:
The Elimination of Negotiability and the Cooling-Off Period, 78 Yale L.J. 618, 647-50(1969).
The Yale study, it should be noted, was based only on the first year's experience with the law,
when financers were faced with new risks; and these financers, in limiting credit to small
dealers, may have reacted more cautiously than the facts warranted. The comment itself
termed this behavior by banks and finance companies an "overreaction." Id. at 655.
Several observers have argued that negotiability was conferred on instruments to facili-
tate their circulation, as substitutes for cash, and that as consumer paper is usually only
transferred once, from seller to financer, there is no need to accord financers the protection
traditionally accorded holders in due course of negotiable instruments. See, e.g., Rosenthal,
Negotiability—Who Needs It?, 71 Colum. L. Rev. 375, 379 (1971); Murphy, Another "Assault
Upon the Citadel": Limiting the Use of Negotiable Notes and Waiver-of-Defense Clauses in
Consumer Sales, 29 Ohio St. L.J. 667 (1968). The business respOnse is that whatever the
function of negotiability oncewas, today it performs the service of facilitating consumer
financing, a service worth preserving.
3
 See, e.g., Leary, Timely Demise of Holder in Due Course Doctrine, 5 U.C.C.L.J. 117
(1972); Speaker, Holder in Due Course—Burden of the Poor, 5 U.C.C.L.J. 146 (1972);
Rosenthal, supra note 2; Navin, Waiver of Defense Clauses in Consumer Contracts, 48
N.C.L. Rev. 505 (1970); Vernon, Priorities, The Uniform Commercial Code and Consumer
Financing, 4 B.C. Ind. & Com. L. Rev. 531 (1963).
4
 I have used an analysis similar to that to be employed below with respect to the
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of the cash purchaser, for the reasons he is usually ignored, and
focus on the two kinds of credit sales—those between seller and
buyer, in which payments can be withheld, and those involving
financers, in which all payments must be made. A credit purchaser
is in a worse position with financers present than with them absent.
He should then attempt to pay less for credit extended by financers.
If the expressly stated interest charges in seller transactions are
identical to those in financer transactions, the "cost" of credit is
nevertheless higher in the latter case, because of the consumer's
impaired tactical position. How much less the buyer should pay
when a financer is present, or by how much more than the stated
interest rate he should value his own credit cost, may be represented
algebraically: Let C represent the cost to the consumer of the losses
he will incur if the seller breaches and refuses to make redress
voluntarily, and the consumer must continue to pay the financer.
Let p represent the probability that cost C will be incurred—i.e.,
that the seller will breach and not voluntarily make redress. The
product of these two, pC, equals the risk, designated R, which a
credit buyer bears if a financer is present; it is the increase of actual
cost over stated price that third party financing under much current
law imposes. 5
 A consumer should seek either to reduce the credit
price by the value of R if, for example, his note is to be negotiated,
or to increase the value of the credit cost to him by the value of R
when deciding whether to purchase at all, or from the seller who
will negotiate the note.
Credit buyers who face the possibility that financers may be
present must be able to value the risk that that presence creates, if
they are to make rational decisions as to whether to take credit and
from whom to seek it. Put simply, credit buyers should know what
problem of defective products, for optimality considerations arc applicable there also, See
Schwartz, The Private Law Treatment of Defective Products in Sales Situations, 49 Ind. L.J.
8 (1973). The relevance of a pursuit of optimality to the question whether consumers should be
allowed to assert sales defenses against financers who lend them money which is then used to
purchase goods has been previously noted and intelligently elaborated in a thoughtful student
note, with which I often disagree but which I nevertheless found quite helpful. Note, Direct
Loan Financing of Consumer Purchases, 85 Ham L. Rev. 1409 (1972).
Economic analysis sometimes equates the cost of goods to buyers with their price. This
equation is inaccurate when sellers shift risks to buyers by contract. For example, when a
seller successfully disclaims all warranties, his buyers bear the risk that the goods will be
defective, but that the seller can nevertheless retain the price and pay none of the losses which
defects could cause. Risks are, as the text indicates, costs to those who bear them, specifically
a cost equal to the product of the probability that the risk will become real—in this illustration
that the goods are in fact defective—and the losses if that probability materializes. If P
represents the price and D the risk of defective goods, the buyer's cost of goods sold with a
disclaimer is actually P + D. Returning to the problem this article concerns, let P = the price
of credit and R = the risk that a credit buyer will be disadvantaged by a financer's presence.
A buyer in a two-party installment sale thus faces a credit cost of P; a buyer with a financer
present faces a cost of P + R.
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credit actually costs. If they cannot value the risk which financer
presence creates, the cost of credit will be distorted because the
stated price will inaccurately reflect the relevant costs. Such dis-
tortions prevent markets from reaching optimal states, i.e., they
prevent the economy from maximizing the output its resources can
yield and from producing the types and amounts of goods which
consumers want. 6
In this article I intend ,to show that consumers misvalue R
because they lack the information to calculate C, the monetary value
of the losses which the presence of financers could cause; nor can
they properly evaluate p, the probability that those losses will be
incurred. Moreover, I contend, the only effective cure for these
misvaluations is to eliminate the risk altogether, by allowing credit
buyers to interpose sales defenses against financers. Should that be
6 Professor Stigler has explained the two "normative" properties of competitive equilib-
rium as follows:
First, the division of output among firms is efficient in the sense that with no other
, division would the same output be so cheap to produce. . . . Second, the output of
the industry is "correct." The price is such that marginal cost equals price. The price
is, for each consumer, the measure of the importance of an increment of the
commodity—a demand price of $2 is implicitly a statement by each consumer that a
marginal unit of this commodity yields $2 of utility.
G. Stigler, The Theory of Price 178, 179-80 (3d ed. 1966). Professor Solow recently gave a
more vivid description:
[A] change in economic arrangements is a good thing if it makes everyone better off,
or at least no one worse off (counting the possibility that there are initially gainers
and losers, but the gainers compensate the losers, so that in the end everyone gains).
What does it mean for someone to be "better off'? Many criteria are possible: You
could say that a man is better off if he makes a bigger contribution to the health of
the state or the glory of God. In economic theory, however, it has usually meant that
he is better off in his own estimation. If you want to know whether A prefers
working over a hot stove or in a nice cool sewer, you ask him; or better still you offer
him a choice between the two jobs and see which he chooses. Similarly for bundles
of consumer goods.
[We should not conclude] that individuals' judgments about their own welfare should
not be respected, whatever their origin. One need only ask what could be put in their
place—presumably the judgments of an elite. The attack on consumer sovereignty
performs the same function as the doctrine of "repressive tolerance." If people do not
want what I see so clearly they should want, it can only be that they don't know
what they "really" want.
Solow, Science and Ideology In Economics, in Capitalism Today 94, 104, 105 (D. Bell & I.
Kristol eds. 1971) (emphasis in original). For particularly cogent and concise statements of the
desirable properties of optimality, see also Lerner, The Economics and Politics of Consumer
Sovereignty, 62 Am, Econ. Rev. 258 (1972); McKean, Products Liability: Trends and Implica-
tions, 38 U. Chi. L. Rev. 3 (1970). This is not to say that people cannot rationally prefer other
economic states to optimality. The principal reason for such preferences is that the goal of
optimality takes the existing income distribution for granted, maximizing choice and resources
within it, while some may prefer to sacrifice optimality for more "just" distributions. See note
39 infra.
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done, financers and sellers will face a new risk—that consumers'will
exercise self help. These business entities, however, are more likely
to value this new risk accurately than consumers now are likely to
value R accurately. Thus if the law is changed, the price of credit
may approximate its real costs, which today is often not the case
because of consumer inability to value the risk that defenses will be
cut off as against financers.
The response to those who oppose such change because it
allegedly raises consumer credit costs is that this view confuses price
with cost and rests on an assumption strange to a market economy.
Initially, price may rise as the result of law reform, for sellers and
financers will attempt to recover the cost of the new risk they face,
that buyers will use self help; but whether the actual cost of credit to
consumers will rise depends on whether this new risk is greater or
lesser in value than the risk buyers now bear under current law. As
the result of comparing these risks will vary from market to market,
the new cost to buyers may therefore be higher or lower, depending
on particular circumstances. Of greater significance, consumers,
after the law is changed, will be able to value credit cost accurately,
for all of that cost will be included in the price. Support for current
law, under which buyers are likely to misvalue R and thus to
perceive inaccurate credit costs, must therefore rest on the premise
that buyers should be kept ignorant of the true cost of installment
purchases, because they are unable to act sensibly when informed.
This may be true, but it is so inconsistent with the assumptions
underlying our society's commitment to a market system that policy
should not be based on it unless it is proved.
Before turning to the demonstration of these points, it will be
useful to indicate more precisely the scope and purpose of this
article. The analysis concerns cases where credit sellers and
financers are already in a bargaining relationship, as when the
financer takes a negotiable note or is the beneficiary of a waiver of
defense clause. Where sellers and financers ostensibly do not deal
with each other, but rather sellers routinely refer buyers to a particu-
lar financer for the credit with which to make the sale, the argument
made below at Section VI applies. Finally, my purpose is only to
consider the conclusions which follow from a pursuit of optimality,
in the economic sense. Were those conclusions our only criteria,
change of existing law would be imperative. But the values optimal-
ity yields, principally that consumers decide what is produced, are
plainly not the only ones a society may justly pursue; and other
values often imply different courses of action than the pursuit of
optimality mandates. These other values are not my concern here. I
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want, in this article, only to put another weight in the scale, the
weight which optimality carries.'
I. THE LOSSES CONSUMERS INCUR AS THE RESULT OF BEING
UNABLE TO ASSERT DEFENSES
AGAINST THIRD PARTIES
As previously discussed, the risk which a credit buyer faces
—that defenses good against sellers will be cut off against
financers—can be represented as R = pC. This section discusses the
difficulties consumers have in quantifying C, the monetary value of
the losses which the presence of a financer could impose. Section -II
discusses the difficulties in quantifying p, the probability of these
losses being incurred.
Assume a simple breach of warranty, for which the seller is
liable. A consumer buyer would be entitled to recover that part of
the purchase price which was paid before discovery of the breach. 8
If the defect occurred during the payment period, and the consumer
was compelled to make the remainder of the payments to the
The magnitude of the risk that -consumers face when they are unable to assert sales
defenses against financers has never been quantified. If it is small, is the gain from legal
change worth the administrative costs thereof? I suggest it probably is, as law reform is quite
cheap because only legal rules need be altered. No administrative apparatus is necessary to
police the new regime; the parties themselves will adjust to the absence of negotiability in
their sales contracts, as today they adjust to its presence.
The states also have already significantly increased the exposure of financers to buyer
defenses, primarily by limiting negotiability and regulating waiver of defense clauses closely.
For a compilation of statutes so doing, see Willier, Need for Preservation of Buyers'
Defenses—State Statutes Reviewed, 5 U.C.C.L.J. 132 (1972). For discussions of similar
judicial developments, see, e.g., Navin, supra note 3; Recent Developments, Proposed Uni-
form Consumer Credit Code for Indiana: Restrictions on Negotiability and Waivers of
Defenses in Consumer Credit Transactions, 46 Ind. L. J. 114 (1970). The National Commis-
sion on Consumer Finance also recently recommended abolition of the holder in due course
rule. See Recommendations of the National Commission on Consumer Finance, 5 U.C.C.L.J.
319, 326 (1973).
Section 2-711(1) of the Uniform Commercial Code provides that when a buyer "right-
fully rejects or justifiably revokes acceptance," he "may cancel" and recover "so much of the
price as has been paid." The textual statement is slightly inaccurate, however, since § 2.608(1)
authorizes revocation of acceptance only when the "non-conformity substantially impairs Its
[the goods] value to" the buyer, and when, innter alia, the buyer's acceptance was "reasona-
bly induced by the difficulty of discovery [of non-conformity] before acceptance .. . ." Buyers
who accept and later complain may therefore be unable to revoke and cancel when the defects
are slight or were observable at the time of sale; such buyers are remanded to §* 2-714 and
2-715, which, while they allow damage claims, do not authorize price actions. However,
defects are seldom observable at the time of sale, and findings that consumers should have
discovered defects which are latent or arguably so will be rare. Thus consumers who have
accepted goods with serious problems will often be able to revoke and recover the price. The
"price," as used above, also includes interest payments, for, although the Cade is not explicit
on the point, it would be anomalous to allow buyers to recover only price but not interest
when the law plainly intends to let them rescind. Cf. Thompson Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc. v.
Myers, 264 So. 2d 893 (Ala. 1972). A buyer's recovery, however, may be reduced by the rental
value of the goods for the period of his use. See Uniform Commercial Code § 2-717.
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financer and later recover them from the seller, he would thus lose
the difference between what he could have earned with the money
and the interest the law provides. For example, if at the time the
defect became manifest there were twenty-five unpaid installments, ,
aggregating $420, the consumer loses the difference between what
he could have earned with $420 and legal interest awarded later in a
judgment for $420. This sum I call the earnings differential. 9
It is sometimes said that the buyer suffers other deprivations
from having to make payments on useless goods. These depriva-
tions, however, are recoverable as damages, and therefore impose as
costs only the earnings differential. Thus if the consumer purchased
a second item, he could recover the expense of making the second
purchase, together with any losses incurred by having to buy at a
higher price."' If, however, the buyer would not have invested the
payments saved by a seller's breach, but would have replaced the
item or bought something else, and if, by reason of having to make
those payments, he is unable to carry a replacement or different
item, the buyer does in fact suffer a deprivation; he loses the
satisfactions the item, or a replacement for it, brings for the length
of time it takes to obtain a judgment against the seller. This loss, the
satisfaction loss, cannot be included in, nor be said to exist along-
side of, the earnings differential, because the buyer would have
either invested or repurchased, but cannot have done both, and thus
cannot recover for both the earnings differential and satisfaction
loss. However, a buyer faced with the decision whether to have
negotiability or not must be able to value both kinds of losses, as
they reflect the alternatives which negotiability withdraws from
him.
9 The earnings differential could be negative. If a buyer would have used the payments
not made to put losing bets on horses, requiring him to make payments to financers which are
later 'recoverable as damages is to force savings. Since valuing the earnings differential is not
necessary to the analysis the text makes, I ignore the valuation issue and assume the
differential to be positive. Also, the text uses the model of a breach of warranty for conveni-
ence, but the analysis is applicable to cases of seller fraud or other wrongs.
1 " See Uniform Commercial Code § 2-712, 2-715. Professor Littlefield, among others,
assumes that it will be more difficult for buyers to make payments on defective goods than on
good ones. When the goods are in fact defective but consumers must continue to make
payments to financers they are thus more likely, he says, to default and face unpleasant
collateral consequences, such as wage garnishment. Any computation of the losses resulting
from a cutoff of defenses rule should then include these consequences. See Littlefield, Preserv-
ing Consumer Defenses: Plugging the Loophole in the New UCCC, 44 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 272,
284-g5 (1969). A buyer, however, by agreeing to the contract, indicated his ability to make the
payments, and would have had to make them if tfie'goods worked. Littlefield's premise—that
it is more difficult to make payments on defective goods—is thus valid only when the goods
were income-producing, and the buyer planned to make payments out of their earnings, or the
goods made possible savings, and a portion of those savings was to be devoted to payment.
Few consumer goods produce earnings, and the savings a particular item makes possible are
likely to be small.
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Buyers may also incur legal expenses to recover installments
whose payment was required by law. Foreclosing defenses against
financers, howeVer, does not necessarily impose legal costs, because
buyers may be motivated to sue sellers regardless of the presence of -
financers. If a buyer in an ordinary installment sale, with no
financer present, made a large down payment, or discovered a
breach after paying many installments, or suffered personal injury
or property damage or commercial loss, the buyer would probably
sue his seller, rather than withhold the remaining payments and
abandon the deal. If these things occurred with a financer present,
suit would similarly be brought against the seller; and if suit were
brought to recover, for example, personal injury damages, it would
cost little to add a claim for installments paid. Moreover, if the
number of unpaid installments is large, a financer may sue even
though defenses may be asserted against him. The presence of a
financer together with legal rules insulating him from buyer defenses
will thus cause buyers to incur legal expenses they would not other-
wise incur only when buyers would have preferred calling the deal
off, rather than suing, and sellers or financers, in the absence of a
cutoff rule, would have let them do so.
In addition, in a two-party installment sale where the goods can
be repaired, the seller has an inducement to repair if doing so will
cost less than the value of the remaining installments the consumer
may withhold. This inducement is lost when the seller has been paid
in full by the financer, who himself can collect the remaining pay-
ments. The consumer can of course pay for repairs himself. These
expenses may be recovered from the seller, but the buyer will have
to sue for them. Thus the buyer may lose the.earnings differential on
the amount he paid for repairs (because if the seller repaired he
would have incurred no expense) plus the costs of suit. The buyer,
in sum, will lose the earnings differential on repair costs plus the
legal expense of recovering them, when at the time repair became
necessary the value of the unpaid installments exceeded the cost of
fixing the item, and the defects were not such as would have caused
the buyer to sue anyway:
The losses an installment buyer suffers when the seller commits
a breach of warranty and the buyer cannot raise defenses against the
financer are thus the earnings differential or satisfaction loss, and
the additional legal expense." Put in the form of an equation, this
" It has frequently been remarked that legal expenses are often so high as to preclude
suit to recover small amounts. See, e.g., Eovaldi & Gestrin, Justice for Consumers: The
Mechanisms of Redress, 66 Nw. U. L. Rev. 281 (1971); Mueller, Contracts of Frustration, 78
Yale L,.). 576, 592 (1969). The additional legal expenses the text notes could thus be so high in
relation, say, to payments made that buyers will not sue to recover them, and the loss will
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may be stated: Loss (if defenses can be cut off) = earnings differen-
tial (on the part of the price paid that otherwise could be withheld),
or satisfaction loss; + additional teal expenses (if any); + earnings
differential (resulting from repair costs when they would otherwise
be incurred by seller). The ideal buyer, interested in maximizing his
resources, will attempt to quantify these losses. Real buyers may not
try, and would likely fail were they to make the effort.
Consumers will be unable to value the earnings differential at
the time they purchase. Initially, consumers are unused to making
such calculations. They will not, perhaps cannot, calculate the dif-
ference in money between what they could do with installments they
need not pay, and the legal interest on those installments if the law
compels their payment and they are later recovered in a law suit. In
addition, such calculations are unlikely to be attempted at the time
of sale, because the usual buyer expectation is that the goods will
work and the concomitant expectation is that the installments will
be paid. Finally, it is impossible to predict the earnings differential
because its value depends on the point in time at which the breach
becomes apparent; it is higher if that point is just after the first
installment, lower if just before the last. Thus to value it one must
be able to predict when defects will become manifest, which con-
sumers cannot do.
It is also difficult to predict the satisfaction loss. Initially, it is
difficult to give a monetary value to deprivations which may never
occur, and if they do, will occur later. In addition, the components
of that loss will vary with future circumstances—they turn on what
the buyer will later have to forgo; and these circumstances may be
hard to ascertain at the time of sale. Finally, buyers are unlikely to
be thinking along these lines.
The legal expense element is also difficult to quantify. Business-
es that have many law suits can roughly predict their legal expenses
over time. But an individual, who probably retains lawyers irregu-
larly, will ordinarily be unable to predict the costs of a future
lawsuit, even were he to think about it; for not only does the cost of
legal services vary, but the cost in any given case is largely a
function of the nature of that case, whether for example it is compli-
cated or simple, and this lay consumers probably cannot predict.
then be those payments. That this occurs is undoubted, but the statistical incidence is
unknown. Moreover, some sellers perceive themselves to be more in the consumer's power for
small claims than large ones; such sellers claim to be unwilling to risk loss of goodwill when
consumers seek to recover small sums, and will thus voluntarily make redress even if no suit is
brought, but will resist large claims because even goodwill has its price. How often, and in
what markets, legal expenses deter small claims thus remains to be established. Hut they do
deter some, and to that extent should be taken into account in the calculus the text makes,
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II. THE LIKELIHOOD THAT LOSSES ASSOCIATED
WITH ALLOWING DEFENSES TO BE CUT OFF
WILL BE INCURRED •
Consumer buyers cannot calculate the statistical probability
that they will incur costs traceable to a cutoff of defenses rule. They
must, inter alia, compute the odds of a seller not voluntarily making
redress. Several factors, however, incline sellers to pay. First, the
value of preserving goodwill induces sellers to comply without coer-
cion; and many retailers allow refunds, sales credits and the like. It
is also foolish for sellers to incur legal costs in an action they cannot
win. In addition, many people will comply with the law because it is
the law. Sellers will thus not make recompense voluntarily•if, among
other things, they honestly doubt the validity of the buyer's claim; if
they care little about buyer goodwill, perhaps because they have a
local monopoly; if their financial circumstances have changed so that
they no longer can pay claims they previously planned to satisfy; or
if they believe buyers will not sue and they care little about
goodwill.i 2 Buyers cannot accurately predict whether sellers will
pay voluntarily because they are unable to measure these factors.
For example, what are the odds that the goods will fail, that there is
a colorable claim that this was not the seller's fault, and that the
seller will assert that claim? What are the odds that a seller, who
gave every indication before the sale of caring about buyer opinion,
will later callously disregard it? What are the odds that a seller's
business will worsen, so that he is less likely to pay claims volun-
tarily, and more inclined to put them off as long as possible?
As has been stated above, the value of the risk, R, that losses
will be incurred because of legal rules prohibiting buyers from
raising defenses against third parties is a function of the probability,
p, of those losses being incurred. The most a buyer can say about
that probability is that sellers may to some degree be less likely to
comply voluntarily with the contract because they have been paid in
full, and their financers can obtain payment regardless of the quality
of the underlying performance. Saying this, however, is saying too
little, because buyers still cannot calculate how much less likely
voluntary performance will be.
This difficulty is compounded by consumer inability to predict
the composition of the losses they will incur should sellers not
perform. We have already seen that consumers cannot value the
earnings differential because its size depends largely on the point in
the payment schedule at which breach becomes manifest, which is
12 For a similar list, see l3ergsten, Credit Cards—A Prelude To The Cashless Society, 8
Ind. & Com. L. Rev. 485, 513-14 (1967).
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unpredictable. It may also be difficult to predict the size of the
satisfaction loss, for that turns on a buyer's future circumstances, as
well as future desires; only a slight loss may be incurred if the buyer
gets a raise or a better job; but such loss could be huge if the buyer
is no longer employed. Finally, it is hard to predict whether addi-
tional legal expenses will be incurred as the result of a cutoff rule,
because, inter alia; the losses the breach causes may be so high that
the buyer will sue although he must continue to make payments to
the financer. Yet, at the time of sale, the size of the loss caused by
breach is difficult to calculate because it depends on the nature of
the breach and the buyer's future circumstances.
In sum, consumers will be unable even approximately to calcu-
late the odds of their incurring losses because of legal rules permit-
ting a cutoff of defenses, nor will they be able to predict either the
composition or the amount of the losses they may incur. The value
of a risk to the one who bears it is the product of the probability that
the risk will become real and the costs reality imposes. Consumer
buyers currently cannot value the risk which current law creates
because they cannot compute the components of the valuation equa-
tion.
III. THE RESULTS OF CONSUMER IGNORANCE
The cost of credit to a consumer is the credit service charge."
But when the sale is financed by a third party who has the right to
require the consumer to pay him, and when state law insulates the
third party from consumer defenses, that cost is increased by the
value of the risk state law creates, viz., that the consumer may be
made worse off by his inability to withhold installment payments. A
consumer who cannot value this risk cannot accurately price the
credit he obtains. If the risk is overvalued, less credit will be
extended than would have been the case had the real facts been
known; and if, as seems more likely, consumers undervalue or
ignore the cutoff risk, an excess of credit will be extended.
Whichever is done, the amount of credit outstanding will be incon-
gruent with consumer desires, and the policy of consumer
sovereignty, or optimality, violated.
The results of this incongruity are worth pursuing. The cost of
credit to consumers, called C,, is the sum of the credit service
charge, called P, and the risk current law creates, R 1 . If the law
were changed to allow consumers to assert defenses against
13 This sum includes time price differential: service or carrying charges, brokerage,
insurance against default, and so forth. See Uniform Consumer Credit Code § 2.109; Con-
sumer Credit Protection Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1605 {i970).
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financers, the new cost, called C2, would be the same credit service
charge, plus the charge the seller or financer makes for bearing the
risk that buyers will withhold payments. For reasons which appear
below, the value of this risk, called R2, is unlikely to equal the value
of the risk consumers now face, and the charge made for bearing it
will thus be called Y. 14 Under much of current law, the consumers'
credit cost can therefore be represented as: C, = P + R 1 . If the law
is changed, the cost will be represented as: C2 P + Y. Whether C2
is greater than C, is of course determined by whether Y, which is
largely a function of the value of R2, is greater than R i . Since the
value of these risks is likely to vary with markets and the parties
involved, it cannot be said that Y will always be greater than Ri ,
and it is thus false to assert that costs to consumers will inevitably
rise if they are enabled to assert defenses against financers.
There is, however, a difference between costs actually faced
and costs believed to be faced. Consumers, we have seen, are unable
to value R 1 , the risk a cutoff rule creates. It seems probable that
they will tend to ignore it, since they may not be aware that defenses
will be cut off or understand the implications of such a rule. Thus,
many consumers may erroneously equate cost with price, perceiving
C 1 as equal to P. If the law is changed, so that sellers and financers
bear the risk that consumers will withhold payments, this risk is
much more likely to make its way into the price, because its value
over many transactions should not be negligible. The new total cost
to consumers, we have seen, will be P + Y, which significantly will
be the new price. All consumers will thus be more likely to perceive
the true cost of credit to them., Those who previously misperceived
= P, and now rightly see C2 P + Y, will subjectively perceive a
cost increase; they will finally see what was true all along but has
now become manifest—that credit is more expensive than they once
thought.
The result of this awareness, assuming demand is constant, is
that less credit will be sought. 1 .5
 But that, to one who seeks optimal-
ity, is a good thing, for true consumer wants are being satisfied.
That is to say, if consumers perceive a cost as low when it is not,
because they undervalue a risk which is a component of it, they are
then seeking more credit than they in fact want because they are
14 Briefly, the risk consumers face is that of bearing the costs of seller intransigence; the
risk sellers and financers face is that the consumer will withhold payments either rightly,
because the goods fail, or wrongly, when they conform. The consumer and business risks,
being different, will have different monetary values. See note 24 infra and accompanying text.
LS This simply restates the law of demand, that people "buy less of a thing when its price
rises." See G. Stigler, supra note 6, at 22. For interesting recent confirmatory evidence, see
Sauter, Gabor & Granger, The Effect of Price on Choice: A Theoretical and Empirical
Investigation, 3 Applied Econ. 167 (1971).
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purchasing at artificially low prices. Argument against legal change
thus necessarily implies that some consumers should be induced to
take more credit than they want, because they cannot sensibly judge
their own interests. This assumption of consumer incapacity may be
true, but it is so inconsistent with the accepted assumptions of our
legal and economic systems that policy should not be based on it
unless it is empirically verified.
IV. REMEDIES FOR THE RESULTS CAUSED BY PRESENT LAW
When parties bargain it does not matter, in theory, which of
them initially bears a risk because they will optimally allocate the
value of that risk between them." Thus which party, seller or
buyer, bears the risk of product failure is theoretically irrelevant to
considerations of optimality. If the seller bears it he will charge
more, because of the risk; if the buyer bears it he will pay less,
because of the risk; but the total cost—price plus risk cost—will be
the same; thus no misallocations will result if the risk is put on one
rather than the other party. L 7 Buyers deal with sellers and financers,
and it would seem that the risk of being unable to withhold pay-
ments could also be optimally allocated by bargains, but this will
not occur because bargains produce optimal outcomes only when the
parties thereto are informed. For example, assume the seller dis-
closes that the buyer's note may be negotiated, i 8
 but agrees not to do
this if the buyer pays an additional sum. This sum we have called Y,
and in a competitive market it will approximate R2, the risk the
seller faces of the buyer exercising self help. 19 The buyer thus knows
the cost of avoiding the risk of being unable to withhold payments,
but what he also must know is what Y buys. If, for example, it is
$2, but the value of the risk the buyer faces from negotiability is $1,
the buyer would prefer to have the note transferred. The price a
seller or financer charges for abandoning negotiability, in short,
communicates to the buyer the price of insurance, but tells him
nothing about the value of the risk being insured against. The buyer
is therefore unable to know whether to insure or not. Put in
economic terms, he cannot know whether having or not having
negotiability will more closely satisfy his wants. 2 °
16 A detailed explanation of this statement and the exceptions to it is found in G.
Citlabresi, The Costs of Accidents 161-73 (1970).
17 This point is developed with respect to products in Schwartz, supra note 4, at 21-25.
'g The Federal Trade Commission recently held that the failure to disclose that a note
will be negotiated is an unfair trade practice, See In re All-State Indus,, Inc. [1967-1970
Transfer Binder' Trade Reg. Rep. ¶ 18,740 (FTC 1969), aff'd, 423 F.2d 423 (4th Cir.), cert.
denied, 400 U.S. 828 (1970),
19 Risks are costs; in competitive markets price tends to equal cost.
29
 This argument demonstrates that informing buyers of their "legal rights," i.e., that the
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There are, again in theory, two ways to resolve this difficulty.
One is to leave the law unchanged but to provide consumers with
the information necessary to value the relevant risk. The second is
to change the law, thus eliminating the risk. The former choice is
unwise for two reasons. First, there seems no practical way to
provide consumers with the information. This is apparent from the
nature of the costs and probabilities themselves, but some examples
can be given. Initially, it will be difficult to provide buyers with the
odds as to whether sellers will be unjustifiably intransigent, since
sellers will deny the existence of the possibility; and the statistics
requisite to provide the truth are likely to be prohibitively expensive
to gather. Moreover, only buyers can value their own satisfaction
loss, since it is so personal to them; but neither can they value it
accurately. Finally, no one can predict, and thus inform - the buyer
of, the probability that he will incur additional legal expenses,
because that turns on circumstances that are unpredictable, such as
when in a payment schedule breach becomes manifest. In sum, the
buyer cannot know these things; the seller is likely to be able to
value only the risks facing him, not the buyer; and outsiders are
unlikely to know more than the parties do. Providing buyers with
information is unlikely to work because the information is unobtain-
able. •
Second, the costs of providing information, if it could be done
at all, probably exceed the gains. The advantage commonly claimed
for the rules insulating' financers from buyer defenses is that they
enable an expansion of credit. Financers who bear fewer risks
charge sellers lower rates for their money, and those lower rates are
passed on to consumers, who are then able to obtain more credit. If
buyers can value the cutoff risk, however, they will perceive these
lower rates as increased by the risk cost. They will thus use less
credit. But they would also use less credit if the law were changed
and the cutoff risk abolished; for the price of credit would then
increase by at least the value of R2. Therefore the benefit current
law provides can in no event be retained, since either
remedy—providing information or changing the law—will cause it
to disappear. The choice of which remedy to pursue, then, appar-
ently turns on the costs of implementation; and it seems cheaper
simply to abolish legal rules than to set up what may be an extensive
apparatus to provide for thb disclosure and supervision of informa-
tion to consumers.
note will be negotiated and the consequences of negotiation, is only a partial solution to this
consumeriproblem. But of course informing consumers of those rights is useful. For thought-
ful suggestions as to what can be done in this regard, see Miller, An Alternative Response to
the Supposed Direct Loan Loophole in the UCCC, 24 Okla. L. Rev. 427 (1971).
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There is, however, a gain from providing information rather
than allowing defenses to be asserted against financers, and prohibit-
ing waivers of the right to assert those defenses: it increases buyer
choice. If buyers are given the information to value the risk the law
now creates, they can choose between bearing it, which means a
lower cash payout for credit, or not bearing it, which means a
higher payout. There is a value to letting this choice be made. The .
issue is whether the cost of providing information together with the
fact that some buyers will not absorb it, thus continuing to act the
way they now clo, 21
 will outweigh the gains freedom yields. This is a
balance we must all strike for ourselves, as freedom cannot be
quantified. I suggest that the choice for a buyer, whether to pay for
the absence of a cutoff rule, is one not central to consumer concerns,
which revolve around quality and elements of price much larger
than the value of this risk; and that the costs of providing informa-
tion, if it can be done at all, are likely to be quite high. The better
remedy, then, seems a repeal of those laws insulating financers from
buyer defenses. It would in fact be better only if abolition would
produce fewer misallocations than current law. This seems to be the
situation.
V. THE RESULTS OF CHANGING THE LAW
To appreciate the effect of changing the law, initially assume a
two-party installment sale, in which the buyer is able to withhold
payments. The seller will be relatively unconcerned with, and in any
event can value, the risk of his own intransigence. The probability
and costs of this he knows, if he plans so to act. Of concern is the
risk that"the buyer will unjustifiably withhold payments, thus im-
posing on the seller the cost of recovery and his own earnings
differential—the difference between what the seller could earn with
the payments and the interest on them the law later grants. Whether
a given buyer will unjustifiably withhold payments is unpredictable;
if that prediction were possible, such buyers could never purchase.
21 Whether buyers will find and absorb information depends on the outcome of their
comparison between the costs of these activities and the gains; concretely, will visiting more
sellers or reading more literature produce a sufficiently better deal to make the additional
visits or reading worthwhile? Because the risk of being unable to withhold payments will
probably not significantly increase the cost of purchase, the gains from reading data and
checking out many sellers should be small, which is to say that buyers will often not be able to
reduce purchase costs enough by doing these things to make doing them worthwhile. Thus
buyers will probably absorb little additional information, which is another reason for not
providing it. Economists refer to the activities of absorbing relevant data and seeking out
sellers as searching; and, in their terms, I am asserting that search costs are likely to be
sufficiently high in relation to risk costs to preclude much searching. For a more detailed
discussion of search and cites to some of the economic literature, see Schwartz, supra note 4,
at 15-16.
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But sellers probably can calculate, over time and for an aggregate of
buyers, the odds of breach and the legal expense and earnings
differential such breaches impose: these calculations may be drawn
from statistical evidence of buyer behavior, which the business
experience of sellers enables them to obtain. A consumer's casual
experience with sellers, on the other hand, renders the accuracy of
his generalizations as to business behavior far less reliable. Install-
ment sellers thus seem better able to value the risk which most
concerns them—that consumers will wrongly not pay—than con-
sumers can value the risk which faces them—that sellers will
wrongly not redress breach.
If installment sales are financed by a third party, and buyers
can assert defenses against him, he faces two risks—that the buyer
unjustifiably will withhold payments and that he will justifiably do
so. Both of these risks the seller probably can value, the former
because of his experience with installment buyers and the latter
because the risk of justifiable withholding is a function of the likeli-
hood of defects and the willingness of the seller to remedy them,
both of which the seller can be expected to know. Some financers
may be unable to make these calculations, except as regards the
probity of the sellers with which they deal. But they are business
entities, and can either shift the risk of buyer breach to sellers, by
use of recourse financing, 22 or require sellers to disclose the relevant
information, and then price credit accordingly. Moreover, some
financers may develop their own experience of the probability and
costs of buyer breach if they finance many consumer sales, and may
thus be able to price credit accurately without much seller help. .
Sellers and financers plainly cannot value perfectly the risk that
buyers will withhold payments. The question is whether these busi-
ness entities are more likely to value correctly the risk that will face
them than consumers are to value the risk which they now face;
and, as we have seen, the business entities are much more likely
than consumers to approach correct valuations. Change in the law
will therefore enhance the chance of buyers knowing the actual costs
of credit; the amount of it outstanding will then be much more a
function of its cost and of buyer desires than it is today.
Law reform will also create a new risk for sellers and financers,
22 In recourse financing, if the buyer fails to pay the financer, the financer recovers from
the seller, who then has to collect from the buyer; in effect, the risk of consumer withholding
remains on the seller. Where negotiability has been eliminated, commentators noted an
increase in recourse financing. See Willier, supra note 7, at 143-44; Comment, supra note 2, at
640. Another response has been for financers to make direct loans to consumers, thereby
attempting to avoid the new law's impact. See, e.g., Comment, Consumer Protection—The
Role of Cut-off Devices In Consumer Financing, 1968 Wis. L. Rev. 505, 524-25. I shall later
argue, in Section VI, that such attempts to avoid the effect of law reform should fail.
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which will probably alter their performance. An important question
is whether, as some commentators now claim, change will be for the
better. 23 Let us return to the world of models, and to the assumption
that sellers and financers can value risks precisely. Assume P, the
credit service charge for a given item, is $10; R„ the risk to consum-
ers flowing from negotiability, is $4; R2, the risk to financers that
buyers will withhold payments, is $3; 24 and 17, the price financers
charge for bearing R2, is also $3. If the holder in due course rule
prevails, the credit cost is $14 (P + R 1 ). Since more can be sold at
prices under $14, financers and sellers will be stimulated to reduce
R 1 by improving the product (redticing the occasions for withhold-
ing), or by voluntarily satisfying buyers (again reducing R 1 ). If
negotiability is eliminated, the new credit cost, C2, is $13 (P + Y).
Y, which is presumed to equal R2, is the sum of two risks, that the
buyer will wrongly not pay, and that he will rightly not do so,
because, for example, the product is defective. Financers and sellers
will also seek to reduc'e R2, by selecting buyers more carefully
(reducing wrongful withholding), and by improving product quality
or service (reducing rightful withholding).
Since $13 is less than $14, financers and sellers will be less
inclined to reduce R2 than they were to reduce R I , since they will
make more sales without negotiability than with it; generalizing,
whenever R2 <R1, seller and financer performance may be impaired
by allowing defenses to be asserted against financers. 25 Also, be-
23 See, e.g., Kripke, Consumer Credit Regulation: A Creditor-Oriented Viewpoint, 68
Colum. L. Rev, 445 (1968); Note, supra note 4. See also Hogan, Integrating the UCCC and
the UCC—Limitations on Creditors' Agreements and Practices, 33 Law & Contemn. Prob.
686 (1968).
24 The risk to financers and sellers, R 2 , can have a different value than the risk to
buyers, R„ because risk values are product of costs and the probability of incurrence. For
example, assume that pd is the probability that the goods will be defective and that the buyer
will thus rightfully withhold payments; that Cd is the resulting cost to financers, in lost profits
which would have been earned had the transaction gone through; that pw is the probability
that a buyer will wrongfully withhold payments when the goods are satisfactory; and that Cw
is the cost, in legal expense and financer earnings differential (if any), which wrongful
withholding imposes. Thus the value of the risk a financer faces from abolishing negotiabiliy
is: R2= pdCd + pwCw. If negotiability is retained, let pi = the probability that the goods will
be defective and that the seller will not voluntarily make redress; and let Ci = the cost to
buyers if this happens—the earnings differential or satisfaction loss and additional legal
expenses (if any). See text at note 11 supra. Thus the value. of the risk the buyer faces from
negotiability is: R,= piCi. There is no reason why pi should equal pw, because there is no
reason why the likelihood that sellers will be intransigent will be the same as that buyers will
wrongfully not make payments. Nor is there any reason why Cd + Cw should equal Ci,
because the costs to businesses of buyers withholding payments are unrelated to the costs to
buyers of intransigent business entities. Therefore, in all likelihood, R2= R,.
25 Since financers and sellers can expand sales by eliminating negotiability when RI < R I ,
one would expect negotiability only when R2> R,. This may, however, be more true in theory
than in fact because it will be difficult for the business entities to value R., the risk facing
consumers, and thus it will be difficult for them to make the requisite comparisons between R I
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cause R I , the risk facing buyers from negotiability, is a function of
the quality of the product and of seller performance, the only way
the business entities can reduce it is to improve one or both of these
elements. R2 ,- however, is a function of these elements, and of buyer
misconduct; it can thus be reduced by more selective credit exten-
sions. To return to the illustration above, if R2 is composed of $1
attributable to buyer misconduct and $2 attributable to rightful
withholding, it can be reduced to approximately $2 by eliminating
bad risks. This yields a price, and cost to buyers, of $12, thus
creating even less incentive for financers and sellers to improve
performance. Even where R2 > R 1 , financer and seller incentives to
improve performance may, where a substantial component of R2 is
buyer misconduct, therefore be less without negotiability than with
it. We cannot then say that allowing sales defenses to be asserted
against third parties will always improve seller and financer perfor-
mance. Whether it will or not depends on the relative size of R2 and
R 1 , and the composition of the former; the business entities will
perform better after law reform than they now do in some markets,
and worse in others.
This conclusion assumes that buyers accurately perceive C 1 ; that
is, that when P + R 1 = $14, buyers react to a $14 cost. If buyers
perceive C 1 as $16, eliminating negotiability will substantially lessen
incentives to improved performance; for C2 can be reduced to $13 or
$12 although the business entities improve nothing. If, however,
buyers undervalue R I , which seems more common, law reform may
improve performance. Assume that buyers value R, as zero, because
they are unaware of or misunderstand negotiability. They then
perceive C, P = $10. Eliminating negotiability forces them to
react to a C2 of at least $12; and they will buy less. Sellers and
financers will then face an incentive, greater than under old law, to
improve their performances. Law reform may also affect financer
and seller performance favorably when buyers undervalue the risk
they face.
However, the new incentive to improved performance, at-
tributable to altering the risks the business entities bear, may some-
times be insufficient, with possibly undesirable results. An argument
made in favor of abolishing the holder in due course rule .is that
abolition will cause financers against whom defenses can be asserted
to deal only with reputable sellers, thereby driving disreputable ones
out of business, or to police the sellers with whom they do deal,
thereby improving their performance. 26 Dealing with different sel-
and R2. The safest course may then be to rely on the law insulating financers from defenses,
i.e., to avoid bearing R2.
26 See authorities cited in note 23 supra.
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lers, however, or engaging in policing activities not previously per-
formed, will impose new costs on financers. They will do these
things only if the costs are lower than R2. Should the costs of
policing be higher than R2, financers will charge its value, Y. This
will result in fewer harms attributable to warranty breaches, but
only because less will be purchased. Put another way, when the
costs of policing or cutting off bad dealers exceed the costs of
bearing the risk of buyer withholding, no buyer who purchases will
have the quality of his seller's performance or product improved,
but because the perceived cost will be higher than before law re-
form, fewer buyers will purchase,' and thus fewer buyers will be
harmed. Whether this is desirable depends on how one feels about
who is excluded.
It therefore cannot be categorically said that improved seller
and financer performance will result from allowing sales defenses to
be asserted against financers. In some cases, our models indicate,
performance will be improved; in others it may be impaired; and in
others fewer buyers will be harmed only because the number of
buyers will diminish. . What can be said with more assurance, how-
ever, is that changing the law will move consumer markets closer to
an optimal state, which is a gain worth pursuing for its own sake. 27
VI. THE PROBLEM OF THE UNRELATED LENDER
The transaction the preceding analysis assumed was an exten-
sion of sales credit, with payments made to the financer. Assume,
27 An argument often made in favor of exposing financers to buyer defenses is that it will
facilitate loss spreading: when a seller goes bankrupt, buyers bear the loss if they must
continue to pay the financer while being unable: to collect from the seller, while the financer
bears the loss if buyers can cease making payments, for he is then left with a bankrupt
defendant; financers are better able to spread losses than buyer's. See, e.g., Note, Preserving
Consumer Defenses In Credit Card Transactions, 81 Yale L.J. 287 (1971); Murphy, supra
note 2. The argument is valid because of the informational problems described above.
Consumers who cannot value risks will be unable to know when it is wise to shift them (for
example, by agreeing to a higher price in return for the elimination of negotiability), since they
cannot measure the costs of a shift against the gains; they therefore may bear risks which, had
they been properly informed, they would have avoided. See Schwartz, supra note 4, at 20.
The gains in loss spreading from law reform, however, will be slight. Initially, the amounts
involved arc small, because buyers at most will save the price, including interest and less rent,
if such rules as those protecting holders in due course are abolished, unless they are also
permitted to recover consequential damages against financers, which few now argue should be
done. Moreover, the risk of seller bankruptcy is quite low. In 1967, only .003% of retail trade
outlets went bankrupt; in 1968, .002%; in 1969, .002%. Dun & Bradstreet, The Failure hate
Through 1968, at 8-9 (1969); Dept of Treasury, Internal Revenue Statistics of Income 10
(1969); U.S, Dep't of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, Statistical Abstract of the United
States 468 (1970); U.S. Dep't of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, Statistical Abstract of the
United States 459 (1971); Business Statistics, 18th Biennial Edition: A Supplement to the
Survey of Current Business 38 (1971). Finally, fraud claims are not dischargeable in bank-
ruptcy. 11 U.S.C. § 35 (1970). All of this is not to say that loss spreading considerations,
arising from the risk of seller bankruptcy, do not point to law reform, but only that they point
weakly.
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however, that the consumer borrowed from a bank to buy a car.
Under current law the loan and sale are considered unrelated; the
sale was foi cash, and the loan, as an independent transaction, must
be repaid. Yet if the car malfunctions and the consumer must
continue to make payments, he will incur the same losses as if the
credit was extended by the automobile dealer and the sales contract
then transferred. Previously, we said, the credit cost was the credit
service charge, and the risk of being unable to withhold payments.
The cost, in this illustration, is the charge the bank exacts and the
risk of being unable to withhold payments to it. For the reasons
given above, the consumer is as unable to value the risk when credit
is extended by the bank as he is when credit is extended by the
seller, and the price of credit is as, much distorted. The consumer
should thus be allowed to assert defenses against the bank.
Reform, however, is senseless if it produces as many misalloca-
tions as it cures, which can at times be the case with unrelated
lenders. Assume, in the case above, that the bank has not dealt with
the dealer from whom the car will be purchased, and that it has no
expertise in the automobile field. Let the law be changed so that
sales defenses can be asserted against it. The risk the bank faces,
that the buyer will withhold payments, is a function, inter dirt, of
the nature of the product and the dealer; the former the bank seems
ill-equipped to evaluate; and the bank may also have difficulty
with the latter because the cost of evaluation, when measured
against the profit from a single loan, may be so high as to justify
only a superficial investigation. The bank, however, can make an ad
hoc bargain with the dealer, refusing to finance the purchase unless
the dealer bears the risk of withheld payments or communicates the
facts necessary to value it. Whether this will be done depends on
the cost to the bank of bargaining with the dealer, which in the case
of a substantial purchase from an identified seller may not be pro-
hibitive. But when the loan is small, the gains from such bargaining
may not justify the costs; and when the loan is for unrestricted uses;
consisting of cash to enable the buyer to live, where the buyer is
likely to make several purchases the particblars of some of which, at
the time of sale, he may not even know, the cost of transacting with
potential sellers will often be too high.
When the costs of bargaining or valuing risks are perceived by
financers as being higher than the gains, they will price the risks
they face arbitrarily, ignore them or refuse to finance sales. In the
former two cases the credit service charge will not accurately reflect
the relevant risks, which means that the price of credit will again be
distorted; and in the latter case, there will be less credit offered than
buyers would be willing to take. Whether consumers should be
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enabled to assert sales defenses against financers when they, rather
than sellers, extend credit thus turns on the answers to two ques-
tions: (1) Will transaction costs, the costs of getting seller and
financer together, be so high that' it will be impossible to predict
fewer misallocations from law reform than now exist? (2) If such a
prediction is impossible, do policies other than optimality justify
allowing buyers to assert sales defenses against unrelated financers?
The latter inquiry is beyond the scope of this article, the former
beyond its grasp, depending as it does on the gathering of much
data; but these are the questions legislatures should address. 28
This analysis may be made more concrete by reference to a
problem which has caused much comment, that of bank credit
cards. 29 Banks issue cards to consumers and pay participating mer-
chants who honor those cards. The consumer's purchase is, from the
28 Several commentators have argued that financers who extend credit directly to buyers
* should be exposed to sales defenses when they are "closely related" to sellers. See, e.g.,
Littlefield, supra note 10. For an analysis of statutes in seven states (Arizona, California,
Massachusetts, New York, Rhode Island, Vermont, Wisconsin) based on this approach, see
Littlefield, Preservation of Consumer Defenses In Interlocking Loans and Credit Card
Transactions—Recent Statutes, Policies, and a Proposal, 1973 Wis. L. Rev. 471, 478-92.
"Closely related," however, is a phrase which can be given content only by reference to an
underlying policy. Should that policy be to pursue optimality, the relevant question is whether
transaction costs will prevent accurate risk valuations. And as to this, whether financers and
sellers are "closely related" is only evidence, not the answer. In concrete cases, the decision
whether to expose financers to defenses will often be the same, regardless of whether one
considers transaction costs or the nature of the seller and financer relationship without
reference to any underlying analytical framework, because transaction costs are likely to be
low where the relationship is close. The question of independent lender liability, however,
should explicitly turn on the relevant issue of transaction costs, for then one is more likely to
address the right questions to the facts.
One particularly thoughtful note .
 argues that lenders should be insulated from buyer
defenses where the loan "is unrelated to any particular purchase," but not otherwise. Note,
supra note 4, at 1423. If the lender is unaware of a loan's particular purpose, he should ask;
the purpose of exposing him to buyer defenses is to make him ask, so that, apparently, he can
then refuse to finance the sale if the seller is disreputable. See id. at 1437. The consumer,
however, may not want to tell. Lenders can condition loans on knowing their purpose, and
thus that purpose will be disclosed; but when the lender has no business need to know, we no
longer have a simple issue but a value choice: Are the gains from making the bank ask the
purpose of the loan worth the losses in privacy to consumers from having to disclose? We live
now in an intrusive society with government and private industry wanting to know much
about each of our businesses. Borrowing money may often be a sensitive matter, and bankers
not the ones to whom many of us want our troubles told. I suggest that when the lender has
no prior bargaining relationship with the seller, and has no business need to know the use to
which the money wilt be put, the gains in optimality, or other things, are unlikely to outweigh
the losses in privacy which are entailed by requiring the bank to ask the consumer's purpose.
When, however, one puts a value like privacy in the scale, certainty tends to flee. My aim is
therefore to call attention to a privacy issue which seems overlooked rather than to argue
strongly for a particular resolution of it.
29
 For previous discussions of the problem as to whether sales defenses should be able to
be asserted against credit card issuers, see, e.g., Brandel & Leonard, Bank Charge Cards:
New Cash or New Credit, 69 Mich. L. Rev. 1033 (1971); Davenport, Bank Credit Cards and
the Uniform Commercial Code, 85 Banking L.J. 941 (1968); Note, supra note 27.
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merchant's viewpoint, for cash, for the merchant deposits the sales
slip with the bank with whom it has an agreement, the depositary
bank, and is then paid. The depo'sitary bank, if it also issued the
card to the consumer, will bill him; if not, it will send the slip to
the issuing bank, which will credit the depositary bank and bill the
consumer. The process works much like the check clearing system.
Should the consumer be allowed to assert defenses arising from the
sale against the issuing bank which bills him?
Whether the consumer will use his card in a transaction with a
merchant who bargains with the consumer's bank is a matter of
chance, for it is the issuing bank which deals with the consumer, the
depositary bank which deals with the merchant, and there is no
assurance that the consumer will buy from merchants who have
credit card arrangements with his own bank. Thus the issuing bank
which extends credit to the consumer, i.e., the financer, and the
seller may often be unrelated. Also, the consumer with a credit card
is obtaining credit to make a variety of purchases, the relevant facts
of most of which he does not himself know when the card is
obtained. Nevertheless, the issuing bank, when defenses are as-
serted against it, could charge the disputed sum back to the deposi-
tary bank, which itself dealt with the merchant who sold the goods
at issue. 3° These two, merchant and depositary bank, do bargain,
and thus could allocate risks among themselves. It has, however,
been claimed that a depositary bank enlists "tens of thousands of
merchants. " 31 Moreover,
[t]he insignificance of any individual merchant's activities
in relation to the total anticipated profit from all charge
card transactions would not warrant a continuing investi-
gation of the merchant as a matter of course . . . It would
be as unfair and unrealistic to expect a depositary bank to
make such an investigation of a merchant who had an
agreement enabling him to accept charge cards as it would
be of a merchant who maintained nothing more than an
ordinary checking account with the bank. 32
However, the depositary bank need not investigate the merchant in
the detail this objection assumes. It can instead enlist the merchant
in the credit card plan only on condition that when issuing banks
" This suggestion has previously been made in Note, supra note 4, at 1420.
31
 Brandel & Leonard, supra note 29, at 1053.
32
 Id. Brandel and Leonard, however, do argue that sales defenses should be able to be
asserted against issuing banks for sales of $50 and up, id. at 1062-64, and when the sales are
made in a limited geographic area, in which are likely to be both issuing and depositary
banks, id. at 1065-66. I find their distinctions between cases when defenses should be
asserted, and cases when they should not, unpersuasive.
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charge sums back to it as the result of disputes about the goods, the
depositary bank will be repaid by the merchant, who will then have
to deal with consumer complaints. 33
 The merchant will thereby be
put in the position, on disputed items, of having extended sales
credit in a two-party transaction, in which payments can be with-
held. The risks stemming from this he can value better than anyone
else. He should then raise the cash price, in which case the cost of
goods to the consumer will accurately reflect all costs. 34
This analysis, however, inaccurately presupposes that credit
cards are used only to obtain credit. It appears that the average
credit card purchase is under $20; the great majority are under $50;
and a large, and rising, percentage of consumers pay for their
purchases on the first billing, thereby avoiding interest charges. The
bank credit card has, for many consumers, come to perform the
function of a checking account." When consumers obtain sales
credit but the law enables defenses to be cut off against financers, or
when they obtain credit from financers to make purchases and must
pay the financers if the goods fail, they are faced with a risk whose
difficulty to value causes distortions in the price of credit. But when
they in effect pay by check, they are making cash purchases; there is
then no risk to value or misvalue, and no reason to change the law.
There apparently should thus be two rules, one for credit card use
when the consumer finances his purchase, making installment pay-
ments to the issuing bank, and one when he does not.
In reality, however, two rules are unnecessary. When it is said
that a card is like a checking account, it is meant that the consumer
intends to pay when billed. When consumers do this, there is no
longer need for differentiation between credit and cash sales. The
consumer is then in the position where, having paid, he must sue
someone, and no case has been made for giving him the bank as
defendant in addition to the seller; put simply, when consumers pay,
the question whether defenses may be asserted against the issuing
bank becomes irrelevant. When consumers fail to pay on the first
billing, or only pay part, they are then obtaining credit, and as such
the argument made above applies, that defenses should be able to be
asserted against the bank. 36
33
 Recourse agreements already seem common in bank credit card arrangements. See
Davenport, supra note 29, at 955-56.
34
 The Uniform Consumer Credit Code reaches a result contrary to that urged here.
Section 3.106(3) provides that a loan, for the Code's purpose, includes "the creation of debt
pursuant to a lender credit card . . . ." Sales defenses cannot be asserted against lenders. The
draftsmen explained the result on the ground that issuing banks cannot know enough about
sellers to police them. Jordan & Warren, The Uniform Consumer Credit Code, 68 Colum, L.
Rev. 387, 437-38 (1968). This may be true, but it is irrelevant.
35
 Brandel & Leonard, supra note 29, at 1059-60.
36 A buyer may charge several items on his card during the relevant billing period and
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Some buyers, however, may fail to pay at the first billing not
because they are obtaining credit, but because the goods are defec-
tive; such buyers will be exercising a right similar to the right to stop
a check. 37 Should the possibility that consumers will not pay only
because 'the goods are defective justify a separate rule that consum-
ers cannot convert cash to credit sales because of the seller's perfor-
mance? Administrative convenience argues against this result. The
question for a court would be why a buyer failed to pay when first
billed, whether he sought credit or a remedy for defects. Such a rule
would require inquiries into particular circumstances as well as
states of mind, both of which are time-consuming. Having one
rule—that consumers may assert defenses against issuing banks
before payment—is simpler to administer and understand. Such a
rule goes further than optimality considerations require, but rules
are often extended or limited for administrative reasons; and since
banks can charge card holders for the privilege of exercising "stops,"
extension here should not work undue hardship on them.
CONCLUSION
Credit buyers are often unable under current law to assert
defenses arising out of their sales transactions against third parties
who have financed those sales. Such buyers in consequence are
unable to use the remedy of withholding payments to coerce. seller
performance; they must initiate law suits; and they cannot recover
pay only part of the bill. If one of the items was defective, does the payment relate to it, so
that it was a cash purchase? Or has the consumer bought it on credit, so he may assert
defenses? The answer should be the latter. A consumer who buys many items and pays part of
the total has essentially obtained credit to make a variety of purchases: He thus faces credit
risks, and since transaction costs seem low enough, defenses should be allowed to be asserted
against issuers in this situation as well. Moreover, given the difficulty of deciding, after sales
have been made, into which category, cash or credit, they fall, a rule presuming cash sales
when the consumer pays in full but not otherwise has administrative advantages.
37
 The analogy to stops can be overstated. Customers may stop checks, under Uniform
Commercial Code § 4-403(1), so long as the.bank has not, inter alia, paid the check in cash,
accepted it, completed the process of posting, "or otherwise ... evidenced ... its decision to
pay the item." An issuing bank which credits a depositary bank's account with the purchase
price has in effect paid the item. If defenses are later asserted against it, little reliance can be
placed on an analogy to the right to stop checks, for checks can only be stopped before
payment. Moreover, customers are authorized to stop checks on the principle that they should
be able to control the people to whom the bank pays their money, while in respect of credit
cards the bank is giving credit with its own money. It will therefore be advanced herein that
the consumer has a right to assert defenses not on the ground that the policies applicable to
checks apply here as well, but primarily because of administrative convenience.
A few states, it may be added, do subject issuers to consumer defenses. See, e.g., Ariz.
Rev. Stat. Ann. § 44-145 (Supp. 1973) (intrastate purchases of consumer durables); Cal. Civ.
Code § 1747.90 (West) (intrastate purchases over $50); Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 255, § 12F
(Supp. 1973); Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 8, § 1305 (1970) (intrastate purchases). Given that issuers may
charge back sums to depositary banks, wherever located, these geographical limitations need
more justification than has so far been shown to exist for them.
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the price or damages until legal action is concluded. This creates a
risk, that the inability to withhold payments may significantly im-
pair a buyer's position, whose value is the product of the losses to
the buyer that the lack of a self help remedy may cause, and the
probability that those losses will materialize. When buyers purchase
on credit and their sales are financed, the total cost of credit to them
is thus the credit service charge, which under current law must be
disclosed, and the value of the risk state law often creates, that
buyers will be disadvantaged by being required to pay regardless of
the seller's performance. For buyers accurately to price credit, they
must be able to value this risk. But it seems unlikely that they will
be able to do so, for its loss component and the probability that
losses will be incurred are both terribly difficult to quantify.
If one accepts the premise that the amount of credit outstanding
should be a function of its cost and consumer desires, current law is
then undesirable; for when consumers cannot price credit accu-
rately, they may purchase too much or too little of it, with reference
to their actual wants. Allowing buyer defenses to be asserted against
financers obviously eliminates the risk of buyers being unable to
withhold payments, because they can then do so. Thus, changing
the law eliminates a risk, difficult of valuation, which causes re-
source misallocations.
Should the law be changed, sellers and financers will face a
different risk, that buyers will withhold payments. However, sellers
and financers can probably value this risk more accurately than
buyers can value the risk they now face. Thus the price of credit will
be mote likely to signal to buyers all of the costs incident thereto. In
sum, changing the law should produce fewer misallocations than
now exist.
Moreover, reform is cheap because only legal rules need be
changed. This is important, for actual markets are much less perfect
than the ideal markets used for analysis, largely because of con-
sumer ignorance. There is thus a case to be made for eliminating
such ignorance whenever it appears. Doing that, however, can be
quite costly. For example, providing buyers with accurate informa-
tion as to the probability and costs of defects in products, which I
have elsewhere argued should be done," is likely to be an expensive
business, which may necessitate the creation of administrative agen-
cies to facilitate and police seller disclosure. The misallocations due
to buyer ignorance of the value of being unable to withhold pay-
ments to financers can be avoided much more cheaply by simply
altering legal rules. The market imperfections attributable to current
36
 See Schwartz, supra note 4, at 29-32.
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law insulating financers from consumer defenses, it must be said,
seem small, because the relevant costs apparently are low; but those
costs nevertheless are likely to be- higher than the costs of cure,
which makes change desirable.
Market efficiency, in the sense that economists use the term, is
worthwhile primarily because it allows consumers to determine
what is produced. This value of consumer sovereignty, I have
shown, implies abolition of the holder in due course rule in con-
sumer sales, the prohibition of waiver of defense clauses and the
allowance of sales defenses against issuers of credit cards. Other
values, of course, impinge on this issue, and may point in other
directions. 39 My thesis is only that the pursuit of optimality, in
which our society often engages, makes requisite this legal reform.
39 The principal argument against change is that it may exacerbate the position of the
poor. Prices are likely to be lower under current law than after reform because bearing risks
costs buyers money only when harm ensues; shifting risks to sellers or financers costs money
always. A poor buyer may feel that although he is unable to value the risk the law now
creates, it is one which is unlikely to bankrupt him and cannot cause him physical harm.
These being so, and money being tight, he would rather gamble, whatever the odds may be;
changing the law precludes this option. There is no logical answer to this objection, as it
depends on which values one chooses. I reject it on utilitarian grounds, that more people,
including many low income consumers, will be better off with reform .than without it.
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